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Color revolutions. Tulip Revolution The opposition continues to fight

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

FEDERAL EDUCATION AGENCY

State educational institution

higher professional education

Novosibirsk State Technical University

FACULTY OF HUMANITIES EDUCATION

Department of International Relations and Regional Studies

Essay

On the topic of:"Tulip revolution" in Kyrgyzstan: causes, course and consequences for the country.

Completed by: RG-85 Yu.V. Spesivtseva

Checked by: V.G. Shishikin

NOVOSIBIRSK

    Introduction………………………………………………………..3

    Kyrgyzstan before the cultural revolution…………………………6

    Background……………………………………………………....8

    Prerequisites……………………………………………………....8

    Driving forces……………………………………………………………….…....9

    Course of events…………………………………………………………….....10

    Conclusion……………………………………………………..….15

    List of sources and literature…………………………..…….17

Introduction

The topic of my essay is “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan: causes, progress and consequences for the country. Purpose of the work: to explore the tulip revolution in Kyrgyzstan. To achieve this goal, it is necessary to solve the following tasks:

    Consider the background of the interaction between the parties

    Determine the prerequisites for the revolution

    Identify and characterize the stages of movement and driving forces

    Analyze the consequences of the revolution for the country

The topic is relevant and may be of interest both to a wide range of the public and to specialists in the field of revolution research.

First, let's look at the definition and characterize color revolutions.

“Color revolutions” in the CIS countries is a traditional name for attempts to change ruling regimes in post-Soviet republics under the pressure of street demonstrations and with the support of foreign non-governmental organizations. In the scientific literature, this term is often replaced by the concepts of “nonviolent revolutions in the CIS countries” or “change of political regimes in the 2000s in the post-Soviet space.” The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (November 2003), the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (December 2004 – early January 2005), and the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (March 2005) were successful. However, there are differences among journalists and experts about whether the events in Kyrgyzstan should be considered a “color revolution”. Unsuccessful attempts at “color revolutions” include the actions of the opposition in Azerbaijan (autumn 2005), Belarus (“cornflower blue revolution” in the spring of 2006), Armenia (spring 2008) and Moldova (spring 2009 – "Hominy revolution").

In addition, events akin to “color revolutions” outside the CIS include the “bulldozer revolution” in Yugoslavia (autumn 2000) and the “cedar revolution” in Lebanon (spring 2005). The forerunners of “color revolutions” are usually considered to be the anti-communist “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Europe that took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s.

Even if these processes can be considered “revolutions,” they are political, not social. If successful, they lead to a change in the country's leadership, but not in the social system. The pretext for them was usually the disagreement of the opposition leadership with the results of parliamentary or presidential elections.

“Color revolutions” in the CIS countries turned out to be successful if their leaders were high-ranking officials who left the executive branch no earlier than one election cycle ago. Thus, the leaders of the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine were former Prime Minister Viktor Yushchenko until May 29, 2001, and former Deputy Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko. The leaders of the revolution in Kyrgyzstan are former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev until May 22, 2002, and former Foreign Minister Roza Otunbayeva. The leaders of the “rose revolution” in Georgia were former Minister of Justice Mikheil Saakashvili, as well as Zurab Zhvania, who served as head of the parliament (legislative body), who was considered shortly before as a possible successor to President Eduard Shevardnadze.

An important factor for the victory of the “color revolutions” was the presence of serious support for the opposition in one of the regions of the country. For the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine, this region was the west of the country, and for the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan, it was the south. Often the search for regional support for opposition actions was facilitated by the cultural and historical differences between regions. At the same time, nationalists sometimes became the core activists for street actions, and in the leadership of the opposition, as a rule, the tone was set by liberal politicians, sometimes not alien to nationalism.

The ideological justification for “color revolutions” came from the West. One of the fundamental works was J. Sharp’s book “From Dictatorship to Democracy. Conceptual Foundations of Liberation", published in 1993. Sharp views the fight against non-Western oriented states as a fight against dictatorship.

It is believed that “color revolutions” represent a process of changing more or less “pro-Russian” regimes to “anti-Russian” ones. In fact, the Shevardnadze regime in Georgia cannot be called pro-Russian, if only because under it there were bases of Chechen militants on Georgian territory. And border incidents, including with the participation of activists of the youth wing of the “party in power” of the Shevardnadze era - the Union of Citizens of Georgia - already took place then. As for Kyrgyzstan, having come to power in the country, President Kurmanbek Bakiyev and Prime Minister Felix Kulov declared a very loyal attitude towards Russia, but behaved much more coolly towards China, whose influence had greatly increased in the country under the previous president Askar Akayev.

Thus, “color revolutions” in the CIS countries became more or less successful conductors of processes associated with the consolidation of the ruling elites and the strengthening of central power, which began in Russia at the end of 1999. Then, too, there was a confrontation between two groups of the ruling elite (expressed in the 1999 parliamentary elections in the confrontation between “Unity” and “Fatherland - All Russia”), but it did not lead to an analogue of the “color revolution”.

It is with this that one can associate the fact that the “color revolutions” in the CIS countries since 2005 have not ended with the victory of the opposition. Those countries where the weak political regime of the 90s was replaced by a stronger and consolidated regime of a new type have already proven to be much more resistant to “color revolutions.” But in Ukraine, the process of forming such a regime and consolidating the ruling elite has not yet been completed - therefore, here the period of political instability has become protracted and turned into something like a “permanent color revolution.”

Kyrgyzstan before the Tulip Revolution

Kyrgyzstan is one of the poorest countries in the CIS. Only according to official data, 50% of the population is below the poverty line, but in reality this figure is much higher. Unemployment, reaching an astronomical figure of 77%, forces unemployed youth to leave to work in Russia and other countries. Many people are forced to find a means of subsistence by stealing anything they can find or by smuggling. The external debt of Kyrgyzstan has reached 2 billion US dollars. The state owes Russia alone about $200 million. Of course, no one knows where these loans went.

The country is ruled by a clan-type dictatorship typical of Central Asia. The corrupt clan of President Askar Akaev owns the main wealth of the country. Kyrgyzstan recently passed a law guaranteeing judicial immunity to the current and former head of state and all members of his family.

The political regime of Kyrgyzstan is also quite typical for this region, although it is somewhat softer than in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Opposition journalists are regularly imprisoned by the regime, and censorship is established in major media outlets. Arrests, exiles, beatings and torture have become commonplace since the mid-90s. The few remaining opposition publications are under pressure. During the elections, administrative resources, intimidation and persecution of the opposition are used to the fullest. In 2002, on the instructions of Akaev, riot police shot at a peaceful demonstration with live ammunition. As a result, several people died and many were injured. The authoritarian regime in Kyrgyzstan did not emerge immediately; Akaev usurped power in several stages. About the same as it happened in Russia

The opposition operating in the country is a rather motley conglomerate of organizations: there are extreme liberals, social democrats and Stalinist communist parties. At the end of last year, some of these organizations, including “Asaba”, “Democratic Movement of Kyrgyzstan”, “Kairan El”, “New Kyrgyzstan”, “Erkin Kyrgyzstan”, “Erkindik”, as well as the Party of Communists, the Communist and Republican Parties united in "People's Movement of Kyrgyzstan". Former Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev was elected chairman of the movement. Among the leaders of the opposition, one can also name the former Minister of Foreign Affairs and leader of the Ata Jurt party, Roza Otunbayeva, as well as Felix Kulolva and Omurbek Tekebayev.

Most of the opposition leaders are former associates of Akaev, yesterday's regime officials who fell out of favor or were deprived of something. From the very beginning, the goal of the opposition was to organize in Kyrgyzstan something similar to what happened in Georgia and Ukraine, i.e. simply redistribute power and property. But by deciding to appeal directly to the masses and call them to revolution, the opposition leaders brought to life such a powerful movement that they themselves could not cope with. As a result, the “Coordination Council of National Unity”, created by the opposition for the purpose of directing events, was in complete confusion during the days of the uprising and found itself paralyzed to no less a degree than the government itself.

The scene of the main revolutionary events was the south of Kyrgyzstan. The country has long had a social and political division between North and South. Akaev and his clan, in whose hands the main wealth of the country was located, were representatives of the more prosperous north. And the more populated South of the country is the center of poverty, which is growing every year.

Background

In September 2004, the Kyrgyz parliamentary opposition sent a request to the country's constitutional court about the eligibility of the incumbent President Askar Akayev to nominate a fourth term in 2005.

October 13- ambassador USA in Kyrgyzstan, Stephen Young expressed hope that Askar Akayev will not run for a fourth term.

December 10- Askar Akayev accused the opposition of being “financed by foreign capital and using dirty political technologies.”

December 22- At the request of Mike Stone, leader of the opposition movement "Ata-Zhurt"("Fatherland") former Minister of Foreign Affairs Roza Otunbaeva called on Russia to stop supporting the Akayev regime.

Jan. 7 2005 - The Central Election Commission deprived Roza Otunbayeva of her candidate registration for the upcoming parliamentary elections. The president's daughter, Bermet Akayeva, is registered as a candidate in the same district.

January 8- V Bishkek Mass pickets in support of Otunbayeva began near the parliament building.

"Akaev, ketsin!" (“Akaev, go away!”) - with these slogans, on March 24, 2005, a mass protest of opposition supporters began in Bishkek. This was followed by the storming of the Government House, the flight of Askar Akayev from the country and a night of looting in the capital, when most of the shops and other retail outlets were mercilessly looted. Later, the leader of the then opposition, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, became the acting head of state. He promised democratic change.

Bakiyev's promises

“One of Akaev’s main mistakes, which I would not like to make, is when the president allows members of his family, his wife, and children to make decisions. This is categorically unacceptable! Akaev’s second mistake is pressure on the press, this should not be allowed,” Kurmanbek said then Bakiev.

But Bakiyev apparently soon forgot about his promises. Both the children and brothers of Kurmanbek Bakiyev are in power today. The pressure on the independent press has only intensified, especially recently. Numerous attacks on media workers have been recorded, several journalists have been killed, others have been forced to flee the country.

The 2009 presidential elections, following which Bakiyev was re-elected as head of state for a second term, took place with numerous violations and falsifications. This has been repeatedly stated by both local independent observers and OSCE representatives

Over the years, Bakiyev has lost the support of almost all of his allies in the “Tulip Revolution”. Today they are again in opposition and are already against the Bakiyev regime. “We all remember very well what promises Bakiyev gave us. He promised that he would put an end to family rule, that the media would be free, but we see what is happening now. Much worse than under Akayev!” – says the leader of the Social Democratic Party of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev.

A number of Bakiyev's former associates were subject to criminal prosecution. Some are in prison, others have left the country. Meanwhile, the republic is preparing another amnesty, timed to coincide with the fifth anniversary of the March events. As the presidential press service reported, Kurmanbek Bakiyev instructed the government to develop a bill on amnesty for persons who took an active part in the people's revolution. For now, however, it is unknown whether, for example, ex-Minister of Defense Ismail Isakov, sentenced to 8 years in prison, or other oppositionists against whom criminal cases have been filed, will be eligible for amnesty.

"The people expressed their will for freedom and democracy..."

President Bakiyev himself, speaking the day before at the Kurultai of Concord convened by him, said that the events of five years ago “became a turning point in the modern history of Kyrgyzstan.” “On that day, our people clearly expressed their will for freedom and democracy. Yes, the revolution aroused the enthusiasm of the people, created the initial conditions for democratic changes, but did not define clear ways to achieve common goals and objectives,” the head of state said.

According to him, half the time that has passed since the revolution has been spent on strife and discord. “Government bodies, instead of solving social problems and development tasks, were engaged in “extinguishing” the rallies and processions that were arising everywhere,” Bakiyev emphasized. He also said that the difficult days are behind us, although the rebellious syndrome has not yet been overcome.

The opposition continues to fight

A little earlier, on March 17, the opposition held its kurultai. She put forward a number of demands to the head of state and gave him a week to fulfill them. “Bakiyev’s two sons and his three brothers should be dismissed from government positions,” says the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Almazbek Atambayev. “We believe that if these and a number of other demands are not met, people have every right to hold their own kurultai in the regions with one agenda - about returning power to the people."

The leader of the parliamentary faction of the Social Democrats, one of the ideologists and active participants in the “Tulip Revolution”, deputy Roza Otunbaeva today recalls how she was in the forefront of the protesters during the seizure of state administrations in the south of the republic. “We did everything possible back then to remove the corrupt government of that time. The current government has not learned any lessons,” Otunbaeva said in an interview with Deutsche Welle.

March 24 has been declared an official holiday in Kyrgyzstan - People's Revolution Day. However, many ordinary Kyrgyzstani people openly say that they have nothing to celebrate.

In the early 2000s, a wave of “velvet revolutions” swept across the CIS countries, organized, as was later confirmed, by the United States. Everyone remembers well about Georgia and Ukraine, but they often forget about Kyrgyzstan. Although this particular country experienced two coups at once in 2005-2010, which surprised many in the world. The first coup in Kyrgyzstan took place on March 24, 2005, resulting in it being called the “Tulip Revolution.”

On February 27 and March 13, 2005, parliamentary elections were held in two rounds in the country led by Askar Akaev. Then the competition for the local Duma was huge: about 400 candidates competed for only 75 deputy seats. The absolute majority in parliament, up to 90%, was won by deputies loyal to the authorities. Even the daughter and son of the country’s president qualified for the Jogorku Kenesh (the son made it in the first round, the daughter in the second). In addition, one of the leaders of the Kyrgyz opposition, who headed the Coordination Council of National Unity, which included the majority of the opposition parties of the republic, ex-Prime Minister Kurmanbek Bakiyev, was defeated in the Jalal-Abad region.

All these facts caused a surge of bewilderment among the opposition, who, after the vote count was completed, began large-scale actions to cancel the election results. The “Tulip Revolution,” dubbed by the West, began in the south of the republic, in Osh and Jalal-Abad: clashes between opponents of the president and law enforcement agencies began there. Protests soon spread throughout the country.

The opposition put forward one demand - to hold repeat parliamentary and presidential elections. They considered the last elections to be fraudulent.

On March 24, in the capital, a crowd of thousands of oppositionists and opposition activists stormed the government building of Kyrgyzstan. President Akaev managed to leave the Government House before the assault. But the oppositionists did not limit themselves to just occupying the government building: they and the looters who took advantage of the opportunity looted and burned supermarkets, jewelry stores, etc. The next day, a crowd of thousands tried to seize the parliament of Kyrgyzstan. The building escaped with only broken doors and windows; the deputies prevented the assault, going out to the protesters on the street.

As a result of these events, which claimed the lives of 15 people, the oppositionists received the right to form the Jogorku Kenesh of the third convocation. The new parliament made Kurmanbek Bakiyev, who had previously lost in allegedly rigged elections, the country's prime minister and acting president.

After such reshuffles, officials of the upper house of the Kyrgyz parliament of the second convocation resigned.

On April 4, Askar Akaev met with the parliamentary delegation of Kyrgyzstan in the Russian capital and signed a letter of resignation from the post of president on April 5. The Jogorku Kenesh accepted it on April 11.

The new authorities accused former President Akaev of creating a “family-clan system of government and usurpation of state power.” Of course, one can argue with this for a long time, but the fact is that the former head of state himself is to blame for the fall in his own rating, under whom corruption flourished in all state structures. This is what Western political strategists took advantage of, telling the Kyrgyz oppositionists how to act in a tense situation.

Hand of the State Department

It must be said that the main factor that served as the starting point for the fight against Akaev and his supporters was the statement by the President of the Kyrgyz Republic in 2004 that the United States had destroyed the main terrorist centers in Afghanistan and therefore must dismantle the air base in Bishkek. The issue of prolonging the agreement with the authorities of the Kyrgyz Republic was constantly discussed by the Pentagon, but Akaev did not want to make a deal.

As it became known many years later, America planned to deploy AWACS (Airborne Warning and Targeting System) to the Republic. Then, as if by magic, former US Ambassador Stephen Young began to intensify his actions in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Former Chairman of the National Security Service of the Kyrgyz Republic Bolot Dzhanuzakov said. He has information that the Americans spent only $52 million on the revolution in his country.

Another interesting fact is that even a year before the March 2005 events, Kyrgyz oppositionists visited the US capital. There they managed to talk with both the Democratic Party and State Department officials. Then the parties noted the similarity of views on the problems in the Kyrgyz Republic and the upcoming election process. American diplomats openly stated that “the government in Kyrgyzstan must change.” And so it happened.

After the visit of opposition figures to Washington, the same Stephen Young recommended using Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for promoting “democracy” in the countries of Central Asia. It was planned to completely withdraw Russia and China from this region.

The organization of the “Tulip Revolution” by the hands of the United States is confirmed by the fact that in 2004 the State Department allocated 53 financial grants to Kyrgyz NGOs and non-profit organizations for the notorious “support of independent media, dissemination of information, training of journalists, ensuring human rights, and also for obtaining legal education.” . In addition, the Americans, using their own $1.7 million, created a modern printing house in the republic.

“The printing presses for publishing the MSN newspaper, while remaining the property of the American government, were leased to the Media Support Fund under the leadership of former candidate for the presidency of the United States, John McCain, and then became available to the Kyrgyz “revolutionaries.” In addition, the White House provided MCH with about $80,000 per quarter for legal expenses alone.”

That is, the United States has completely taken upon itself the incitement of hatred towards Akiev through the media. In addition, they supported their opposition dolls well in the country: they paid them approximately 120 thousand dollars a year (2004-2005)

The most interesting thing is that the supported opposition candidate Kurmanbek Bakiyev, after taking the post of President of Kyrgyzstan, was kicked out of his seat with the same shame five years later. But more on that later.

Rallies were also held in Bishkek, Talas and Osh regions. In the Osh region, protesters decided to seize buildings and officials with a demand to review the election results regarding individual candidates who lost the elections. These demands were satisfied during the CEC retreat. Law enforcement agencies did not interfere in what was happening; in the southern regions, police officers were often simply not visible on the streets, which is indirect confirmation that they either were not given the order to suppress the rallies, or they sabotaged it.

The republic's authorities decided to use force to suppress spontaneous protests in the south of the country. Force operations were carried out to liberate the administration buildings seized by demonstrators in Osh and Jala-Abad, which led to escalation of the situation and even greater intensification of the demonstrators. As a result of the protests, the official authorities completely lost control over Jala-Abad and Osh, and with them the entire south of Kyrgyzstan was completely cut off from the northern regions. Two high-ranking officers of the Osh Internal Affairs Directorate 4 announced their switch to the side of the opposition.

At this time, the opposition and the authorities declared the need to start negotiations as soon as possible for the sake of a peaceful resolution of the conflict. However, under no circumstances did the opposition intend to give up demands for the resignation of the president and the cancellation of the results of the parliamentary elections, and the authorities did not want to negotiate when the opposition put forward such unconstitutional conditions 5 .

In Bishkek, for the first time in many years, President Askar Akaev did not take part in the celebrations on the occasion of the spring holiday of Novruz and did not address his fellow citizens on television. A number of analysts during this period expressed concerns regarding the emergence of interethnic conflicts in the country with the participation of Osh Uzbeks and the intervention of Uzbekistan.

Trying to confirm the positions of the existing regime, Akaev categorically refused to resign, and the Central Election Commission approved the results of the past parliamentary elections. Meanwhile, unrest gradually spread to the north of the country. In the north there were no such unrest as in the largest southern cities of the republic - Osh and Jalal-Abad, but here, too, the opposition seized government institutions: the telegraph office, the post office, and district administrations. The leaders of the Kyrgyz opposition did not exclude the possibility of secession of the southern regions of Kyrgyzstan and the formation of an independent state; Kurmanbek Bakiyev, in particular, stated this. In this case, the Kyrgyz revolution had every chance of developing into a civil war. In response to this, the neighboring states of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan unilaterally closed their borders.

By the end of this stage (March 23), a certain calm arose, both sides were preparing for decisive action. While the official authorities have still used force to restore order - in the center of Bishkek, riot police dispersed an opposition rally, and some of its participants were detained. Moreover, unlike the southern regions, where law enforcement forces fled or mixed with the crowd at the first serious confrontation, this time the police showed determination and even toughness. It was obvious that the authorities were trying their best.

At the same time, the opposition intended to organize a “kurultai” in Bishkek on March 24. Mass opposition marches from three ends of the city were planned to converge in the center and encircle government buildings.

The capital, where the conflict was finally to be resolved, looked more and more like a besieged fortress. The central areas were cordoned off by police units and soldiers of internal troops, armed, however, only with rubber batons and plastic shields. In contrast to them, opposition supporters continued to arrive in the capital from the south of the republic, gathering in the suburbs.

The main events, which later culminated in the “victory of the revolution” and called the “Tulip Revolution,” began to unfold at 10 a.m. on the outskirts of the capital. The opposition rally, among the participants of which stood out children aged 6-7 years with pink headbands and banners “Akaev - resign!”, was opened by the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Keneshbek Dushebaev. He stated: “All actions must proceed peacefully” and called on the demonstrators to prevent a fratricidal war 6 . After Kurmanbek Bakiyev's speech, the crowd moved towards the White House. By prior agreement with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the convoy was freely allowed through the police barriers.

As the movement progressed, the opposition lost control of the situation: several dozen men burst into the ranks of the protesters and provoked a fight. The attackers, who outnumbered the demonstrators, were repelled, but the skirmish had disastrous consequences. Hundreds of heated people, mostly young, armed with stakes, pieces of rebar, and stones, swept away the police cordon and burst into the White House building, destroying everything in their path. After this, pogroms began in Bishkek, which lasted for several days and ran in parallel with all other events.

By evening, the ranks of the opposition were replenished with a real leader. A group of oppositionists headed to the suburbs of Bishkek, where the most famous opposition leader, Felix Kulov, was serving his sixth year in prison in a colony. He was released, and within half an hour Kulov addressed the nation on Kyrgyz state television.

By nightfall, the old government no longer existed in Kyrgyzstan. The plane carrying President Akaev landed in Almaty, where his family had been flown by helicopter a few hours earlier. The previous government was dismissed after its head Nikolai Tanaev announced his resignation. The security ministers remained in their positions for now - this was necessary in order to maintain order in Bishkek and throughout the republic. The opposition addressed the judges of the Supreme Court live. They were asked to appear at the meeting to consider the case of violations committed during the parliamentary elections, which brought victory to the parties that supported Askar Akayev. A little later, the Supreme Court of Kyrgyzstan, at an emergency meeting, overturned the results of the parliamentary elections. Thus, the court returned powers to the previous composition of parliament 7.

By the morning of March 25, the Kyrgyz parliament of the previous convocation appointed Kurmanbek Bakiyev as acting president and prime minister of the country. Immediately after this, Bakiyev appointed another opposition figure, Roza Otunbayeva, to the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs. The leader of the Ar-Namys party, Felix Kulov, who was released from prison the day before, became the coordinator of all law enforcement agencies of the republic, and the acting prosecutor general was opposition member of parliament Azimbek Beknazarov. The CEC was headed by the former deputy chairman of the commission, Turgunaly Abdraimov.

By the morning of March 26, the new government managed to completely take control of the situation and stop the unrest. On the same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin had a telephone conversation with Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Putin expressed Russia's readiness to provide Kyrgyzstan with all necessary assistance. At the same time, the Kremlin press service confirmed that Akaev was in Moscow.

In two days after the storming of the Government House in Bishkek, 5 people were killed and more than one and a half thousand were injured (during the assault itself, 350 people were injured, there were no casualties). The Kyrgyz parliament has scheduled early presidential elections for June 26. After them, new parliamentary elections were to take place.

Chapter 3. Results of events

In general, the situation allows us to say that new people were able to gain a foothold in power, because fundamental changes in the political system have not yet occurred.

Despite the “Tulip Revolution,” the economy basically continued to maintain the same vector of development as under the previous regime, which threatened an even greater increase in social discontent and a repetition of revolutionary events.

The new leadership promised the people stable economic development and improved living standards. But in reality everything turned out to be not as smooth as it was in words. In Kyrgyzstan, during the period following the revolution, a number of positive and negative trends have emerged.

Positive trends were a reduction in tax rates and an increase in the country’s position in the ranking of economic freedom (high level of freedom in the field of trade, taxation, and labor relations). This affected the influx of foreign investment.

Meanwhile, along with positive trends, negative trends continue to appear.

The trade deficit continues to grow, due to the predominance of imports over exports by 2.5 times 8 . Changes also occurred in agriculture - the level of production decreased by 3.2%.

The socio-economic situation of the population is still difficult - according to official data, half of the country lives below the poverty line, according to unofficial data - up to 70% 9 .

And as a natural result of all these processes, there was a decrease in GDP growth - to 2-3% per year, compared to 5% in the 1990s - 2000s. This growth is ensured by the service sector - trade and catering 99 .

The main problem in the implementation of legislation is excessive government intervention in private business, the presence of excessive, often duplicating functions of government bodies, as well as non-compliance with laws. At the same time, instability and unpredictability of business regulation policies still remain; low level of transparency and government decision-making in the field of legal and economic regulation. All of the above is aggravated by the widespread manifestation of corruption in all its forms.

Also, the government's intentions to privatize all remaining state property in the country, and especially the energy sector, raise concerns. Thoughtless and poorly organized privatization may end with property falling into the hands of officials or shadow structures 10 .

Thanks to this state of the economy, the same negative social phenomena that existed in the country before the revolution persist: an increase in infant mortality, an increase in the number of diseases of all types, mortality, external migration and crime, and the depopulation of national minorities. The reasons for these processes are the unfavorable economic situation.

Bibliography

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Introduction…. page 2.

No. 1. Successful “color” revolutions…. page 2-6.

1.1 “Rose Revolution” Georgia 2003…. page 2-3.

1.2 “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine 2004…. page 3.

1.3 “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan 2005…. page 3-4.

1.4 Overthrow of Bakiyev…. page 4-5.

1.6 Parliamentary republic…. page 5-6.

2.1 “Cornflower cornflower” Belarus 2005…. page 6.

2.2 “Snowdrops” Armenia 2008…. page 6.

2.3 “Tiled” Moldova 2005…. page 6-7.

Conclusion…. page 7-8.

Introduction

Color revolutions are a set of technologies characteristic of the beginning of the 21st century for the forceful change of political power in a particular state by organizing mass street protests of part of its population.

Mass riots organized by the opposition in the post-Soviet space are considered classic color revolutions: the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (2004), the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (2003), and the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (2005).

Mass riots in Belarus (2006), Armenia (2008), Moldova (2009) and Kyrgyzstan (2010) are also equated with attempts to carry out color revolutions.

According to experts, color revolutions become successful only in those countries where weak political power is combined with freedom of speech, the opposition has significant support from below, as a rule, in some region of the country, and also where opposition youth organizations are active at the time of the revolution .
The main distinguishing feature of color revolutions is recognized by both their supporters and opponents as the presence of a single scenario for the development of events. Namely:

All color revolutions in the post-Soviet space occur after the elections. The losing side declares the election results fraudulent.

Revolutionary actions are expressed in mass rallies, strikes and demonstrations against the election results.
The opposition is led by forces and leaders who were previously part of the government structures, but were removed from power.
An external arbiter acts as a commentator and active participant in events.
Power is seized by force, however, the bloodless nature of the seizure is emphasized.
The consequences of the color revolution boil down to a change in the geopolitical orientation of the victim country in favor of the external force that financed it.

No. 1 Successful “color” revolutions

1.1) “Rose Revolution” Georgia 2003
The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia (November 2, 2003 - January 4, 2004) occurred due to mass dissatisfaction with the policies of the country's President Eduard Shevardnadze. It was associated with a difficult economic situation, corruption and interethnic problems. The situation worsened during the parliamentary elections on November 2. Officially, the pro-government bloc “For a New Georgia” won, while the results of exit polls indicated the victory of “National Unity”, whose leader was Mikheil Saakashvili.
The opposition, represented by Mikheil Saakashvili, Nino Burjanadze and Zurab Zhvania, demanded to cancel the election results; its negotiations with President Eduard Shevardnadze did not bring any results. On November 12, the collection of signatures for Shevardnadze’s resignation began. The president himself stated that he would accept resignation only through constitutional means. On November 20, the official election results were published, and already on November 22, thousands of rallies and protests took place.
Nino Burjanadze was announced and... O. President of Georgia. On November 23, Eduard Shevardnadze, under pressure from the opposition, signed a decree on his resignation. In January 2004, elections took place for a new president, Mikheil Saakashvili, who received more than 96% of the votes.
1.2) "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine 2004
The reasons for the “Orange Revolution” in Ukraine (November 22 - December 26, 2004) were discussions around the country’s accession to NATO and the European Union and the transition to parliamentary democracy, the struggle for media freedom and fair elections. The impetus for this revolution was also the presidential elections, the first round of which took place on October 31, 2004. Candidates Viktor Yanukovych and Viktor Yushchenko received approximately an equal number of votes, but not enough to win - 39% each.
On November 21, the second round of elections took place, and according to exit polls, Viktor Yushchenko had a clear advantage (about 58% of the votes against 39% for Yanukovych). On November 22, the first election results were announced, according to which Yanukovych became the leader. Oppositionists Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko initiated consideration in the Verkhovna Rada of the issue of no confidence in the Central Election Commission, and rallies were held in Kyiv and other cities of the country in defense of both candidates. On November 23, parliament was unable to gather a quorum to make any decision, and Yushchenko declared himself president. On November 24, the Central Election Commission published the official election results: 49.46% of the votes for Yanukovych and 46.61% for Yushchenko.

As a result of the actions of the opposition and mass strikes on November 27, the results of the second round of elections were declared invalid, and repeat elections (“third round”) were scheduled for December 26. On January 10, 2005, Viktor Yushchenko was declared the winner with 51.99% of the votes. According to surveys, 18% of the country’s residents took part in the “Orange Revolution,” but almost half of the citizens supported it.

1.3) "Tulip Revolution" in Kyrgyzstan 2005
A number of economic and political problems led to the “Tulip Revolution” in Kyrgyzstan (February 27 - April 5, 2005), including differences between the relatively rich north and poor south, corruption and nepotism, and the weakness of the power of President Askar Akaev. The reason for the revolution was the parliamentary elections held on February 27 and March 13, 2005, as a result of which about 90% of the seats in it were taken by representatives of pro-government and neutral forces, including the children of President Askar Akaev.
The opposition, claiming falsification of the election results, began mass protests on March 4, which were especially active in the south of the country - in the cities of Osh and Jalal-Abad. On March 22, unrest spread to the north, and on March 24, an opposition rally demanding Akaev’s resignation was held in the country’s capital, Bishkek. The government building was captured by the opposition. During the pogroms, five people were killed, 1.5 thousand people were wounded and injured.
The main political events of the “Tulip Revolution” revolved around two parliaments - the old bicameral and the new unicameral. Both of them met at the same time. On March 25, by decision of the old parliament and on March 28, by decision of the new parliament, Kurmanbek Bakiyev became acting president and prime minister and presidential elections were scheduled. On April 4, Askar Akayev signed a decree on his resignation effective April 5, 2005. On July 10, presidential elections were held, where Kurmanbek Bakiev received about 90% of the votes.
1.4) Overthrow of Bakiyev
After the removal of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev from power as a result of the “Tulip Revolution,” the situation in the country changed for the worse. The regime of the new head of state Kurmanbek Bakiyev turned out to be even more corrupt and authoritarian. As a result, the “yellow tulip revolution” of 2010 occurred, which was a repetition of the events of 2005. According to US Assistant Secretary of State George Krol, the regimes of Akayev and Bakiyev were destroyed not by the struggle between Russia and the United States for spheres of influence, but by corruption.
Then the south rebelled, and now the north. At the same time, the complaints against the authorities are still the same: against the usurpation of power and the fact that Bakiyev “placed” his relatives everywhere.
These Kyrgyz events became the first color revolution, the reason for which was not elections, but other phenomena: the continued struggle between the north and south for power, rising prices for housing and communal services, and, finally, Bakiyev’s intention to introduce “deliberative democracy” instead of elections.
On April 5, 2010, opposition leaders were arrested. But already on April 7, power was in the hands of the opposition, who formed a new “Provisional People's Government” headed by Roza Otunbayeva, a former famous diplomat and the main character of the past “Tulip Revolution”. Parliament and the Central Election Commission were dissolved, and President Bakiyev was forced to leave the capital.
On April 7 and 8, mass protests took place in Bishkek and other regions of the republic, during which more than 1.5 thousand people were injured and more than 80 died. By the night of April 8–9, the situation in the capital was stabilized. The nominal president of Kyrgyzstan, Kurmanbek Bakiyev, refused to resign and called for an international investigation into the events of April 7-8 and the deployment of peacekeeping forces to the country. However, on April 15, Bakiyev, who fled the country, signed a letter of resignation. Bakiyev later showed up in Belarus under the protection of President Alexander Lukashenko. At home, Bakiyev faces trial “for numerous crimes against the Kyrgyz people.”
1.5) June pogroms
A new wave of unrest in Kyrgyzstan followed in June 2010. On the night of June 11, pogroms of houses and buildings of Kyrgyz Uzbeks began in the Osh and Jalalabad regions, and about 75 thousand civilians of Kyrgyzstan were forced to cross the border of Uzbekistan. During the unrest, by June 15, 127 people died, about 1,500 sought medical help, 779 were hospitalized, and up to 150 thousand gathered on the border with Uzbekistan. Radio France Internationale later clarified the death toll - 294 people - and qualified the incident as an “armed ethnic massacre” and a “crime against humanity.” France and the United States demanded an international investigation into the events.
Russia refused Kyrgyzstan's request for military assistance from the CSTO forces in resolving the internal conflict, but the security of the Russian military air base in Kant was strengthened, and Russian citizens were evacuated from Osh to Bishkek and then to Moscow in an organized manner. According to the military commandant of Jalal-Abad, Colonel Kubat Baibolov, interethnic pogroms became a “screen” for a well-organized protest by Bakiyev’s supporters - among the attackers were relatives of the deposed president, foreign fighters, and youth extremist groups. Later, the version of Kyrgyz-Uzbek interethnic clashes was completely rejected by the President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov: “I am categorically against such allegations. Neither the Uzbeks nor the Kyrgyz are to blame for this. These are subversive actions, organized and controlled from the outside.”
1.6) Parliamentary republic
On June 28, 2010, a referendum was held in Kyrgyzstan on the adoption of a new constitution, introducing a parliamentary form of government instead of the presidential one. More than 70% of the country's citizens took part in the voting, more than 90% of them were in favor, and Roza Otunbaeva was elected president of the transition period until 2012, and she also headed the Provisional Government. Parliamentary elections were scheduled for October 10, 2010. Russian and European Union observers noted some shortcomings in the organization, conduct of the referendum and vote counting.
No. 2 “Color” revolutions that failed
2. 1) “Cornflower cornflower” Belarus 2005
Preparations for the revolution in Belarus began long before the 2006 presidential elections. The name of this revolution - “cornflower blue” or “jeans” - was also invented in advance. On March 19, 2006, presidential elections took place, in which the current President Alexander Lukashenko was elected to a third term. 82.6% of voters voted for him.
The losing opposition, led by ex-presidential candidates Alexander Milinkevich and Alexander Kazulin, organized relatively massive (from three hundred to several thousand people) rallies and protests, and a tent city appeared on Oktyabrskaya Square in Minsk.
The demands of the losing candidates to invalidate the election results were rejected by the Central Election Commission. On March 24, the police arrested the protesters and dismantled the tents. The attempted revolution failed.
2.2) “Snowdrops” Armenia 2008
Three years before the riots in Yerevan, the media stated that a “snowdrop revolution” was planned in Armenia. On February 19, 2008, presidential elections were held in the country, which were won by Serzh Sargsyan. Former Armenian President Levon Ter-Petrosyan, another candidate in these elections, did not accept defeat and organized protests that began on February 20, 2008.
On March 1-2, pogroms and clashes between protesters and the police occurred, as a result of which 10 people died and 265 were injured. In an interview with Rossiyskaya Gazeta, Serge Sargsyan described what happened as an attempt at a color revolution. Participants in the riots, including opposition politicians, were arrested, five of them were later sentenced to one and three years in prison.
Hayk Harutyunyan, the former chief of police of Armenia, suggested that all opposition activities during the March 1-2 riots in Yerevan were organized and could have been developed during the pre-election period.
2.3) “Tiled” Moldova 2005
Moldova was on the verge of a color revolution on the eve of the 2005 elections. However, the main events (“brick revolution” or “tile revolution”) unfolded in April 2009. On April 5, the results of local parliamentary elections became known, in which the Communist Party received more than 50% of the votes. On April 6, demonstrations began in Chisinau, in which more than 10 thousand people took part.
On April 7, the parliament building and the presidential palace were stormed. The protesters demanded the resignation of President Vladimir Voronin and the ban on the Communist Party he leads. One person died during the mass pogroms. The ex-president of Moldova was confident that the unrest in Chisinau was taking place according to the scenario of a color revolution and that external forces were involved in their organization - in particular, the Romanian special services and the leaders of radical youth groups.
Analysts see the main reason for the failure of the “revolutionaries” in Chisinau as the absence of a strong opposition leader. However, the president and the ruling party eventually agreed to hold new parliamentary elections in July 2009. The Moldovan communists lost them.

Conclusion

There are several basic elements of “color revolutions.” We came to the conclusion that a necessary element in the technology of revolutions is the creation of network youth movements, “infected with the idea of ​​revolution and a change of power. Until then, the importance of young people in election campaigns in general and voting in particular was underestimated. It was considered a politically passive group of the population. Meanwhile, in all three coups, youth political organizations played a crucial role. Firstly, all mass actions involving the population were carried out with the help of young people, mostly students. Secondly, youth organizations brought tens of thousands of people onto the streets who were capable of resisting the security forces. Thirdly, it was the mass participation of young people that created an aura of “genuine revolutionism” around the events that took place and made it possible to present the movement as a national cause.

A special role in “color revolutions” is played by color and symbols themselves, since it is sign systems, in contrast to meaningful verbal communication, that affect the deep spheres of the psyche. Political strategists are well aware of their meaning, and therefore the choice of a “red rose” or “red tulip” as a symbol of the revolution is not at all accidental.

It is obvious that it is impossible to reveal all the details of such modern technologies for changing political regimes as “color revolutions” within the framework of one work. It is important to record their main characteristics.

So, revolution in the classical sense requires a combination of at least three necessary conditions. Firstly, there must be not only socio-economic, but also political prerequisites for a revolutionary situation. Secondly, revolution is impossible without organization, financial support and manipulation of information flows. And finally, the last in the list, but not the least in importance: revolution is impossible without ideology, a new social project.

In the revolutionary upheavals of modern times, the complex of factors necessary for a natural revolution is not represented. However, financial, organizational and informational support to anti-system forces from abroad plays a huge role. At the same time, the regimes of only those countries whose resources, strategic or geopolitical position the West is interested in are subject to pressure. In other words, “color revolutions” are initiated in those regions that fall within the orbit of interests of the leading players in the world system.